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portant, but, nevertheless, significant cases cannot be included. It is
hoped that the Survey nonetheless accomplishes its basic purpose, viz.,
to key the practitioner to significant developments in the procedural
law of New York.
ARTICLE 1 - SHORT TIT=E, APPLICABILITY AND DEFINITIONS
CPLR 105(j): Age of majority changed to eighteen.
The Legislature has added a new subdivision (j) to CPLR 105.
This subdivision defines the words "infant" and "infancy" when used
within the context of the CPLR. Under the new definitions, an infant
is one who has not yet attained the age of eighteen.'
ARTICLE 2- LIMITATIONS OF TIME
CPLR 214: Tort statute of limitations adopted for strict products lia-
bility.
The scope of recovery for personal injury and property damage
caused by a defective product has been greatly expanded since Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co.2 eliminated the requirement of privity in
negligence actions. Although this right of recovery predicated upon
negligence is well settled, it may provide inadequate protection in cer-
tain instances." Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals has seen fit
I N.Y. Sass. LAWs [1974], ch. 924, § 1 (McKinney).
2217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 INN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
8 Recovery predicated upon a negligence theory may be had only if the following
elements can be proven: (1) the plaintiff is within the category of persons to whom the
manufacturer owes a duty of reasonable care, see MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050 (1916); (2) the manufacturer did not use such care; and (3) the
negligently caused defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. See W. PnossER,
LAw op ToPrs 143, 641 (Hornbook ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROssER]. The plaintiff
may rely on res ipsa loquitur as an aid in proving negligence, but such proof may be
difficult, or even impossible, particularly where a manufacturer can demonstrate that he
generally used reasonable care throughout the manufacturing process. Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 612 INs. L.J. 141, 142 (1974). See also Velez v.
Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1978)
(per curiam) (plaintiff's suit dismissed in negligence but upheld on the theory of strict
products liability); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.YS.2d 461
(1973), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 48 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 616 (1974) (jury found
manufacturer free from negligence, but rendered verdict for the plaintiff on the theory
of extended breach of warranty).
An even greater burden is imposed upon a plaintiff choosing, instead, to rely on the
traditional cause of action for breach of warranty. He must prove: (I) contractual privity
between himself and the seller; (2) the contract contained express or implied warranties
not effectively disdaimed; (3) the defect causing the injury was a breach of the warranty;
and (4) the defect proximately caused the injury. See N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (McKinney
1964). Broad disdaimers and adherence to privity requirements serve to limit the effective-
ness of these Code provisions in protecting the consumer.
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